Inside this Issue

A1 - No Common law Indemnification Duty Owed by General Contractor to Project Owner for Subcontractor Employee Injuries Where GC Did Not Control and Supervise the Subcontractor’s Work
A2 - Indemnity Obligation Not Owed to Client for Claims Partially Caused by Client’s Negligence. Duty to Defend Only Applies to Claims Directly Attributable to Indemnitor’s Actions within Scope of Work
A3 - Statute of Limitations for Breach of Contract Rather Than Negligence Applies to Lawsuit against Engineer That Performed Services Pursuant to Written Contract
A4 - What Warranty Notice to Contractor is Required Before Owner Retains Different Contractor to Repair and Replace Defective Work?
A5 - Asbestos Damages Are Excluded under Condominium Association’s Property Insurance Policy

Article 1

No Common law Indemnification Duty Owed by General Contractor to Project Owner for Subcontractor Employee Injuries Where GC Did Not Control and Supervise the Subcontractor’s Work

See similar articles: duty to defend | Indemnification clause

Where a general contractor performing a build-out for a store tenant (not the project owner) retained the services of a subcontractor for certain work and an employee of the subcontractor was injured by falling from a ladder, the project owner sued the contractor for common law indemnification and contractual indemnification for damages for which the Owner had been found vicariously liable under the state’s statutory law. Although the general contractor had not itself been found to be directly liable or vicariously liable for the subcontractor employee injuries, the property owners argued they were entitled to common law indemnification. They asserted the general contractor contractually assumed sole responsibility and control of the entire project, and had the contractual authority to (1) direct, supervise and control the means and methods of plaintiff's work, and (2) institute safety precautions to protect the workers. The Owner asked the Court to adopt a general rule that a party may be liable for common-law indemnification upon a showing that the party (i.e., the proposed indemnitor) either was actually negligent or had the authority to direct, control or supervise the injury-producing work, even if it did not exercise that authority. What the Owner asked to court to do was equate a party that merely has authority to direct, control or supervise the work with a party who is actively at fault in bringing about the injury suffered by the plaintiff. The appellate court held that in the absence of proof of any negligence or actual supervision of a general contractor, the mere authority the general contractor has to supervise the work and implement safety procedures is not a sufficient basis to require common law indemnification of the project owner. McCarthy v. Turner Construction, Inc., 953 N.E. 2d 794, (New York, 2011).

In rejecting the project owner’s argument the court held:

A party cannot obtain common-law indemnification unless it has been held to be vicariously liable without proof of any negligence or actual supervision on its own part. But a party's (e.g., a general contractor's) authority to supervise the work and implement safety procedures is not alone a sufficient basis for requiring common-law indemnification. Liability for indemnification may only be imposed against those parties (i.e., indemnitors) who exercise actual supervision (Citation omitted). Thus, if a party with contractual authority to direct and supervise the work at a job site never exercises that authority because it subcontracted its contractual duties to an entity that actually directed and supervised the work, a common-law indemnification claim will not lie against that party on the basis of its contractual authority alone.

Here, Gallin and nonparty Ann Taylor, Inc., not the property owners, entered an agreement under which Gallin was Ann Taylor, Inc.'s general contractor/construction manager. Further, Gallin engaged a subcontractor (Linear), which, in turn, engaged its own subcontractor (Samuels), the entity which employed plaintiff. Although the agreement, inter alia, required Gallin to supervise and direct the work at the premises owned by the property owners, this fact alone was insufficient to establish that Gallin actually supervised or directed the injured plaintiff's work, especially in light of the fact that Gallin contracted the work [out to a subcontractor,] that resulted in plaintiff's injury, and Supreme Court's findings that Gallin (1) had no supervisory authority over Samuels's (plaintiff's employer's) work, (2) would not have directed plaintiff as to how to perform his work, and (3) did not provide any tools or ladders to the subcontractors who worked at the site.

Although the GC interacted with the subcontractor and the sub-subcontractor firm whose employee was injured, the GC had no supervisory authority over the sub-subcontractor’s work and it provided no tools or ladders to subcontractors that worked at the site.

No Contractual Indemnification

Citing case law that stands for the proposition that through a contractual indemnification clause, an owner who is only vicariously liable by statute may seek full indemnification from the party that is wholly responsible for the accident, the court found in this case that there was no direct contractual relationship between the project owner the general contractor. The contract was in fact between the contractor and a store tenant of the project owner. In addition, the owner had no third party beneficiary rights under the contract between the contractor and the store tenant. For these reasons, the contractual indemnification was dismissed on summary judgment by the trial court and that dismissal was affirmed on appeal.

Common law Indemnification

Even in the absence of contractual indemnification, a contractor could have an indemnification obligation that is created by common law which “imposes obligations upon those actively at fault in bringing about the injury.” Reviewing decisions by various New York appellate division courts, the Court of Appeals observed that some courts had found a common law duty to indemnify based solely on the fact that a party had contractual authority to supervise the work at a site, whereas other courts limited the duty to those who had “actually supervised and controlled the injury-producing work.” After reviewing these cases, the court concluded that a preponderance of case law reveals the courts “have usually, consistent with the equitable principles of common-law indemnification and this Court’s teachings, imposed the obligation to indemnify on parties who were actively at fault in bringing about the injury.”

For these reasons, the court held that because the general contractor in this case “did not actually supervise and/or direct the injured plaintiff's work, [Contractor] is not required to indemnify the property owners under the common law.”

About the author: Article written by J. Kent Holland, Jr., a construction lawyer located in Tysons Corner, Virginia, with a national practice (formerly with Wickwire Gavin, P.C. and now with Construction Risk Counsel, PLLC) representing design professionals, contractors and project owners. He is founder and president of a consulting firm, ConstructionRisk, LLC, providing consulting services to owners, design professionals, contractors and attorneys on construction projects. He is publisher of ConstructionRisk.com Report and may be reached at Kent@ConstructionRisk.com or by calling 703-623-1932. This article is published in ConstructionRisk.com Report, Vol. 14, No. 5 (May 2012).

Article 2

Indemnity Obligation Not Owed to Client for Claims Partially Caused by Client’s Negligence. Duty to Defend Only Applies to Claims Directly Attributable to Indemnitor’s Actions within Scope of Work

See similar articles: duty to defend | Indemnification clause

Where an indemnity clause did not expressly state that the subcontractor was required to indemnify its client, the prime contractor, for all damages including those caused partially by the client’s own negligence, the subcontractor’s indemnification obligations were limited to those damages determined by a jury to have been caused by the subcontractor’s own negligence only. Although the clause stated that the subcontractor was required to indemnify for all claims “save and except claims or litigation arising through the sole negligence” of the prime contractor, this was not deemed sufficient by the court to constitute an express agreement to indemnify for damages caused by the prime contractor’s own negligence – even if caused only in part by the prime contractor. In reversing the trial court’s award to the prime contractor of almost $1 million in defense attorneys fees under the duty to defend section of the indemnification clause, the appellate court held the court erred in awarding the fees incurred in defending against the third party claims without first apportioning those fees incurred in defending claims “directly attributable to [subcontractor’s] scope of work, if any.” Reyburn Lawn & Landscape Designers v. Plaster Development Company, 155, P.3d 268 (Nevada, 2011).

The contract between the contractor, Plaster Corp. and the subcontractor, Reyburn Corp., contained the following indemnification clause:

INDEMNITY: ... Subcontractor agrees to save, indemnify and keep harmless Contractor against any and all liability, claims, judgments or demands, including demands arising from injuries or death of persons (Subcontractor's employees included) and damage to property, arising directly or indirectly out of the obligation herein undertaken or out of the obligations conducted by Subcontractor, save and except claims or litigation arising through the sole negligence or sole willful misconduct of Contractor, and will make good to and reimburse Contractor of any expenditures, including reasonable attorney's fees. If requested by Contractor, Subcontractor will defend any such suits at the sole cost and expense of Subcontractor.

This case began when home owners filed a class-action complaint against the developer/general contractor alleging that their perimeter retaining walls and sidewalls were defective as a result of improper design, preparation, materials, and construction. Over a year and half after the suit was filed, the contractor notified the subcontractor and demanded a defense of the claims pursuant to the indemnification clause. The subcontractor didn’t take over the defense as demanded and the contractor brought a third-party claim against the subcontractor for indemnity and/or contribution, and also asserted a breach of contract claim against the Sub for failing to defend.

In resolving this appeal, the court began by explaining that strict interpretation is applied to indemnification clauses. “When the duty to indemnify arises from contractual language, it generally is not subject to equitable considerations; rather, it is enforced in accordance with the terms of the contracting parties' agreement.” In this regard, the court cited a recent decision in which it stated:

We adopted the rule that, while the parties are free to contractually agree to indemnify another for its own negligence, “an express or explicit reference to the indemnitee's own negligence is required.” Therefore, “contracts purporting to indemnify a party against its own negligence will only be enforced if they clearly express such an intent and a general provision indemnifying the indemnitee ‘against any and all claims,’ standing alone, is not sufficient.”

The holding concerning indemnification was stated as follows:

Here, Plaster argues that the agreement's scope was intended to indemnify Plaster for its own negligence so long as Plaster was contributively, not solely, negligent. Plaster explains that because the agreement expressly excludes indemnification for its sole negligence, the parties intended that Plaster would be indemnified for its contributory negligence. Therefore, according to Plaster, once it demonstrated that it was not solely negligent in causing the defects, the indemnification agreement was triggered. The district court agreed and determined that Plaster only needed to demonstrate that it was not solely negligent in order to invoke the indemnity clause and thus granted Plaster's motion for judgment as a matter of law. We disagree and conclude that because the indemnity clause is not explicit about whether Reyburn is required to indemnify Plaster even if Reyburn is not negligent, and as to whether the scope of the agreement includes indemnity for Plaster's contributory negligence, the clause necessarily covers only Reyburn's negligence.

According to the indemnity clause at issue here, Plaster must be indemnified for “any and all” liabilities that “aris[e] directly or indirectly out of” Reyburn's obligations under the subcontract. Consistent with our holding in Brown, we determine that this phrasing does not unequivocally condition Reyburn's duty to indemnify Plaster upon anything other than Reyburn's actions, and it does not explicitly state that Reyburn has to indemnify Plaster for Plaster's own negligence. Because the clause at issue here is not explicit, and because we must strictly construe the indemnity clause's language, (citation omitted), we conclude that there must be a showing of negligence on Reyburn's part prior to triggering Reyburn's duty to indemnify Plaster. Otherwise, Reyburn's duty to indemnify could arise from another subcontractor's obligation or scope of work, which should trigger that subcontractor's duty to indemnify, if any, not Reyburn's. Moreover, the indemnity clause does not contain a clear and unequivocal statement of the parties' intent for Reyburn to indemnify Plaster for Plaster's own negligence. … Thus, we conclude that because the indemnity clause does not expressly or explicitly state that Reyburn would indemnify Plaster for Plaster's contributory negligence, Reyburn is required to indemnify Plaster only for liability or damages that can be attributed to Reyburn's negligence.

In its holding addressing whether the subcontractor had a duty to defend the indemnitee, the court began by acknowledging that the duty to defend is broader than the obligation to indemnify in that “[t]he duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify” because it covers not just claims under which the indemnitor is liable, but also claims under which the indemnitor could be found liable. The court concluded:

We now hold that unless specifically otherwise stated in the indemnity clause, an indemnitor's duty to defend an indemnitee is limited to those claims directly attributed to the indemnitor's scope of work and does not include defending against claims arising from the negligence of other subcontractors or the indemnitee's own negligence….

To invoke the duty to defend, the plaintiffs' complaint must have sufficiently alleged negligence on the part of Reyburn, or their claims must have concerned Reyburn's scope of work for the project…. We conclude that the indemnity clause in this case does not unequivocally or explicitly state that Reyburn would be required to indemnify Plaster, even if Reyburn was not negligent, and does not clearly require indemnification for Plaster's contributory negligence. Therefore, the indemnity clause must be interpreted against Plaster, meaning that Plaster must prove negligence on the part of Reyburn before the clause is triggered and that Plaster may be indemnified only for damages associated with Reyburn's negligence….

Because Reyburn's duty to defend Plaster is limited to those claims directly attributed to Reyburn's scope of work and does not include defending against the negligence of other subcontractors or Plaster's own negligence, we conclude that whether the homeowners' complaint sufficiently alleged negligence on the part of Reyburn, triggering its duty to defend, was also a material issue of fact for the jury to decide. Thus, we conclude that the district court erred in granting judgment as a matter of law on Plaster's breach of contract cause of action as well.

For these reasons, the court reversed the trial court judgment against the subcontractor, and concluded that the matter must be decided by a jury as a question of fact rather than as a matter of law.

Comment: The Nevada court in this case cited favorably the California decision of Crawford v.Weathershield, and stated that it was following the principles of that decision with regard to determining whether the subcontractor had a duty to defend the contractor.

In crafting indemnification clauses, the case demonstrates the importance of choosing the language carefully to avoid any uncertainty as to what is expected of the indemnitor.

Article 3

Statute of Limitations for Breach of Contract Rather Than Negligence Applies to Lawsuit against Engineer That Performed Services Pursuant to Written Contract

See similar articles: Statute of Limitations

A suit against an engineering firm for professional malpractice was timely filed even though the four year statute of limitations period for tort actions had lapsed, where the services were performed pursuant to a written contract, because the six year statute of limitations applicable to breach of contract actions applies to all actions concerning the contracted work regardless of whether the alleged breach stems from the express terms of the agreement or duties that are implied in the agreement as a matter of law. The Supreme Court of Georgia considered two sections of the state civil code addressing time limits for filing actions. One section applicable to unwritten agreements stated “All actions … upon any implied promise or undertaking shall be brought within four years after the right of action accrues.” The other section applicable to written agreements stated “All actions upon simple contracts in writing shall be brought within six years after the same become due and payable.” The issue in the case was which code section was applicable to the suit against the engineer since the underlying basis for the breach of contract claim was alleged professional malpractice in the performance of services concerning an allegedly failed design of a concrete platform around a facility to control drainage. An earlier Court of Appeals decision in this matter concluded that because the issue “calls into question the conduct of professionals in their area of expertise, it [was] a claim for professional malpractice, and the four-year statute of limitation applied.” In this final Supreme Court decision, however, that judgment was reversed, and the court held that where the services are performed pursuant to a written contract, the longer statute of limitation applicable to breach of contract actions must be applied. In Newell Recycling of Atlanta v. Jordan Jones and Goulding, 703 S.E. 2d 323 (Supreme Court, Georgia 2010).

Comment: This decision is included in the newsletter as a counterpoint to casenote in last month’s ConstructionRisk.com Report discussing a similar case decided in another state, which reached a different result. The cases show that the interpretation and application of the statutes of limitations vary. It can be tricky to determine which statute applies when it comes to claims for breach of contract where the breach was due to negligence in the performance of professional services.

Article 4

What Warranty Notice to Contractor is Required Before Owner Retains Different Contractor to Repair and Replace Defective Work?

Vinyl floors installed by contractor in the operating rooms of a new hospital suffered from bubbles and split seams, and created a rough and uneven surface. For over a year the contractor attempted to correct the problems, and did so for beyond the one year warranty period. When it became apparent to the hospital, however, that the problems were continuing and that the repairs by the contractor were failing to resolve the fundamental problems, the hospital retained another contractor to evaluate the problems and completely remove the vinyl, retreat the underlying concrete surface, and install all new flooring. In response to the hospital’s claim against the original contractor to recover the cost of replacing the floors, the contractor argued that it owed no duty to the hospital because the one year warranty period had expired and also because the hospital failed to give it adequate notice of the intent to hire another contractor to replace the floors without giving the original contractor the opportunity to do that work itself. A jury awarded over $300,000 to the hospital for breach of the express warranty. This was affirmed on appeal, with the court holding the hospital acted reasonably in giving up on the contractor’s ability to remedy the problem and hiring a new contractor for the work without giving the original contractor “written notice” and an opportunity to do the total repair itself. Berkshire Medical Center v. U.W. Marx, Inc., 644 F.3d 71 (1^st Circuit, 2011).

In its appeal, the contractor argued that the floor replacement took care of problems that developed after the one-year warranty period , but that to the extent bubbles and seam separations were within the warranty, the warranty required that the contractor be given the opportunity itself to do the repair work. The contractor also argued that the hospital waived any right to recovery because it failed to provide “written notice” to the contractor as required by the contract. A key question to be resolved on appeal was whether the bubbles and splits should be reviewed as separate events or as a single episode.

At trial, the jury instructions allowed the jury to conclude, if warranted by the facts, that the splits and bubbles were a manifestation of the same underlying problem regardless of whether they occurred before or after the one-year warranty period. It was reasonable, said the appellate court, to permit the jury to decide whether the problems were individual defects or manifestations of larger problems such that they were “symptoms of a disease”. Having concluded the latter, it was also reasonable to allow the jury to decide that adequate notice of the problem was given by the hospital to the contractor within the one-year warranty period and that the work to replace the entire floor after the one-year period was still within the warranty requirements.

As explained by the court, “[Contractor] was placed on notice of it once a succession of bubbles and splits appeared and were called to its attention even if neither side then fully understood the full scope of the problem.” Even if the hospital failed to give the notice, the court concluded that “any such failure was not likely a ‘material breach’ and, in any event, was ‘excused’ when [Contractor] accepted whatever notice was given and started to make the repairs.”

The court acknowledged that the language in the contract required the hospital to give the contractor a chance to remedy the problems itself before the hospital resorted to a replacement contractor. The court explained:

[T]he agreement make[s] clear that the contractor is entitled to be told of and given a chance to remedy the defect by itself; nowhere does the agreement suggest that the contractor's obligation is to let the owner choose some other contractor to implement some other remedy. Nevertheless, the court concluded: “But, while the contractor gets first crack, there has to be some end point. If the contractor refused to do anything, the owner could do the job itself and sue for the cost; the result cannot be otherwise if, after repeated efforts over an extended period....” We think a reasonable jury could find, even if not compelled to do so, that Berkshire properly invoked the warranty. Two years and a number of spot repair efforts by Marx had not led to any solution; a hospital can hardly be expected to tolerate indefinitely unsafe conditions….

***

As for giving Marx the option of doing the replacement job itself, Berkshire had little reason to think that Marx either could be trusted to do it or would have any interest in doing so. Replacing the entire floor in phases, while the hospital continued to perform surgeries in less blemished segments of the suite, was obviously a drastic and very expensive proposition. Marx never volunteered to do it and even now does not suggest that it would have done so if asked.

For these and other reasons, the court affirmed the judgment against the contractor.

Article 5

Asbestos Damages Are Excluded under Condominium Association’s Property Insurance Policy

See similar articles: Asbestos | Contractors Pollution Liability | CPL | Insurance Coverage Disputes | Pollution Exclusion

Where a property insurance “open peril” policy for a condominium association contained a pollution exclusion, there was no coverage afforded for damages arising out of a contractor’s work of an asbestos remediation contractor. The association hired the contractor to scrape acoustical ceilings and stairways that contained some asbestos. In the process of performing the work, asbestos fibers were released into the air, the common area hallways, stairwells and some individual units – and even some areas outside of the building. A comprehensive abatement of the building to clean up the mess was required. No recovery could be obtained from the contractor since its general liability policy contained a specific asbestos exclusion, and the firm itself was insolvent. When the association’s property insurance carriers declined coverage, the association filed suit, alleging that because the policy did not specifically state that damage caused by asbestos was not covered; the policy was ambiguous despite a broad and clearly stated total pollution exclusion that would appear to exclude any and all pollution claims regardless of the type of pollution. The association also argued that the release of asbestos was only a one time event caused by negligence of a contractor and was not the type of “release” that the pollution exclusion was intended to apply to. In Villa Los Alamos Homeowners Association v. State Farm Insurance Company, 198 Cal. App. 4^th 522 (Cal. 2011), the court upheld a trial court decision in favor of the insurance company, finding that damages were excluded from coverage under the policy.

In granting summary judgment for State Farm, the trial court stated it is a “fact of common knowledge” that asbestos is a pollutant. State and federal laws that define asbestos as a “toxic pollutant” were also deemed instructive as whether asbestos was a pollutant within the meaning of the policy. The question then was whether the manner in which it was released, and by whom, would affect whether it would be deemed a “pollutant” within the meaning of the “pollution exclusion” of the insurance policy. In this regard, the court concluded “it is irrelevant whether it was negligent or intentional or a one-time incident.” What was most important to the court was the scope of the release and the fact that it was released in the environment – particularly becoming airborne and making it to the street, driveways, gardens and sidewalk.

What the association was trying to argue is that a single release of asbestos via the negligent work of a contractor is similar in nature to the “natural application” of pesticides, which the California courts have previously been held to be a covered event despite the pollution exclusion of the policy. Cases have considered whether an insured party could reasonably have understood and expected a particular type of event to be excluded from coverage under the pollution exclusion. In this instance, however, the court found that the Association and contractor were both aware that the ceiling material contained asbestos. And whereas an association might purchase and apply on its own something like pesticides to kill bugs, “it is highly unlikely that a homeowner, on his or her own, could remove acoustical ‘popcorn’ ceilings containing asbestos without violating a myriad of laws….” The heavy regulation of work on asbestos-containing materials was considered by the court to demonstrate that the Association could not expect the work on asbestos in this instance to be merely an “ordinary act of negligence” for which the Association should reasonably expect coverage despite the pollution exclusion.

Another argument the Association vainly tried was that the pollution exclusion applies only to industrial activity and incidents, and lacks plausibility in a “residential” context. Without suggesting that such a distinction would make any difference, the court pointed out that the argument was completely misplaced here because “In essence, a commercial contracting process was badly botched in a large residential compound.”

It did not matter to the court whether the dispersal of the asbestos was widespread or local, or whether it was recurring or just a “one-time” release. The court completely rejected the Association argument that the “[r]elease of asbestos in a single condominium building is not [a] ‘dispersal’ such that a reasonable layperson insured would understand it to be ‘environmental pollution’ subject to the exclusion.” One-time events, says the court, can create a “pollution event” that is subject to the pollution exclusion of the policy. Examples of such events, provided by the court, include a worker that sustains injury from contact with wastewaters containing chemicals, which occurs from repairing a sewer line. Even a one-time event that causes an “impurity, something objectionable and unwanted” can constitute an “environmental pollution” subject to the pollution exclusion of the policy, explains the court.

One final argument that the Association tried was that the insurance company should have included an industry-standard asbestos exclusion on the policy, which it has available and has used with other policies, and that failure to use that endorsement here creates an ambiguity and leaves open a question of whether the policy intended to cover asbestos. The court was not impressed and concluded, “[n]otwithstanding that an asbestos endorsement was available but not incorporated into the policy, the scope of the pollution exclusion remains the same.” For all these reasons, the court held that the release of asbestos in this case constituted environmental pollution within the meaning of the pollution exclusion. Judgment in favor of the insurance company was, therefore, affirmed.

Comment:

In its decision, the court cited a number of cases that demonstrate how broad the standard pollution exclusion is and the kinds of damages that fall within the pollution exclusion even when the pollution event is not some huge environmental disaster. As explained by the court,

[Cases] have upheld applicability of the exclusion in a variety of settings involving CGL policies. (Garamendi v. Golden Eagle Ins. Co. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 480, 486, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 642 (Golden Eagle ): the widespread dissemination of silica dust as a by-product of industrial sandblasting operation would commonly be thought of as *533 environmental pollution and thus came within the exclusion, the court also noting that there need not be wholesale environmental degradation to constitute pollution; Ortega Rock Quarry v. Golden Eagle Ins. Corp. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 969, 980–981, 990, 46 Cal.Rptr.3d 517 (Ortega ): pollution exclusion precluded coverage for rock quarry operator's activities of placing dirt and rocks in creek bed; dirt and rocks were pollutants subject to the exclusion; American Casualty Co. of Reading, PA. v. Miller (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 501, 515, 71 Cal.Rptr.3d 571 (Miller ): layperson reasonably would understand release of methylene chloride into public sewer is a form of environmental degradation; coverage precluded even if triggering event was a negligent one-time release; Cold Creek Compost, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1469, 1471, 68 Cal.Rptr.3d 216: pollution exclusion barred coverage for offensive and injurious odors coming from a compost facility and spreading over a mile away.)

Instead of attempting to spend lots of money on attorneys fees and court cases trying to shoe-horn environmental pollution damages into policy coverage, it seems a more prudent and cost effective risk management for the condominium association would have simply been to require its contractor to secure and maintain a contractor’s pollution liability (CPL) policy that included coverage for asbestos releases, and to name the Association as an additional insured under the policy. Indeed, this is a good way to prequalify firms before contracting with them. One has to wonder about a contractor that knowingly performs work on asbestos-containing materials without first obtaining a CPL policy.

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ConstructionRisk.com Report (May 2012)